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Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Securities: Applying 
Delaware’s Demand Requirement to Section 16(b) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the share price of LinkedIn’s initial public offering (IPO) 
jumped 109% in the first day of trading,1 some wondered whether 
the event was the start of another tech bubble2 or “hot issue” market 
where a series of IPOs witness dramatic price increases in the first 
month of trading.3 Since the 1950s, there have been four hot issue 
markets,4 including the most recent during the late-1990s tech 
boom, where almost 200 IPOs doubled on the first day of trading.5 
The same question has accompanied each of these hot issue markets: 
in light of the seemingly exorbitant fees paid to sophisticated 
investment banks for an optimal IPO price,6 were the underwriting 
banks really unable to even closely predict the market price of the 
IPOs, or were issuers intentionally leaving vast amounts of capital on 
the table?7  
 
 1. Stu Woo et al., LinkedIn IPO Soars, Feeding Web Boom, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2011, 
at A1. 
 2. See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, In LinkedIn IPO, Hints Of Another Tech Bubble?, NPR.ORG 
(May 26, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/26/136655334/in-linkedin-ipo-hints-of-
another-tech-bubble. 
 3. Roger G. Ibbotson & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, “Hot Issue” Markets, 30 J. FIN. 1027, 1027 
(1975) (defining hot issue markets “as periods in which the average first month performance 
(or aftermarket performance) of new issues is abnormally high”); see also In re Initial Pub. 
Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 4. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
 5. Jay R. Ritter, Big IPO Runups of 1975-2011, U. FLA. (May 20, 2011), 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/Runup7510%20(2).pdf. In the twenty-four years 
before 1999, only thirty-nine IPOs doubled on the first day of trading. Id. 
 6. For example, LinkedIn IPO fees totaled over $20 million. Brett Philbin, Fee 
Bonanza! Wall Street Rakes in Millions from LinkedIn IPO, WALL ST. J. DEAL BLOG (May 19, 
2011, 5:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/05/19/fee-bonanza-wall-street-rakes-
in-millions-from-linkedin-ipo/. 
 7. A number of theories have been proposed for the “underpricing phenomenon.” 
Roger G. Ibbotson & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 993, 995–1001 (R. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (outlining, 
among others, the “winner’s curse hypothesis,” the “cascades hypothesis,” the “investment 
banker’s monopsony hypothesis,” the “lawsuit avoidance hypothesis,” and the “signaling 
hypothesis”); see also Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Should Issuers Be on the Hook for 
Laddering? An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulation Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. 
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Almost inevitably, some investors have suspected foul play and 
have alleged fraud under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (Exchange Act).8 In Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Securities, 
however, the plaintiff alleged a new theory of liability and sued the 
underwriting banks under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act to 
recover profits on behalf of the issuers.9 In denying the plaintiff’s 
standing to make a Section 16(b) claim, the Ninth Circuit used 
Delaware corporate law to conclude that the plaintiff’s pre-suit 
demand was insufficient, or in other words, that the plaintiff failed to 
adequately request issuer action before filing her own suit on the 
issuer’s behalf.10 
This Note argues that due to the conflicting purposes of 
Delaware’s demand requirement and Section 16(b), the Ninth 
Circuit should not have dismissed the suit using Delaware demand 
law. More broadly, this Note argues that before courts fill the gaps 
of federal securities law with state corporate law, they should 
consider the fit between the two types of law. Doing so will prevent 
state law from impeding federal policy and otherwise valid securities 
claims and will prevent unnecessary displacement of well-functioning 
state law. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the most recent hot issue market of the late 1990s and early 
2000, plaintiff Vanessa Simmonds, like many others, felt that the 
drastic first-day IPO price changes were not due to market forces but 
instead were the result of a scheme between the underwriters and 
insiders of the issuing companies to capture exponential gains from 
 
REV. 179, 186 (2004) (“A large price gain on the first day suggests that issuers have left 
substantial sums of money on the table.”); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial 
Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 724–25 (2005) (“[T]he underpricing of IPO 
shares is often an intentional act designed to extract wealth for the few that receive original 
IPO allocations.”). 
 8. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
 9. Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3063 (2011), and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). It should be 
noted that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear an issue addressed in Simmonds 
regarding the statute of limitations requirement of Section 16(b). Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) 
LLC v. Simmonds, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (mem.); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Credit 
Suisse Sec., 131 S. Ct. 3064 (No. 10-1261). This Note does not address that issue. 
 10. Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1094. 
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underpriced IPOs.11 Instead of filing a traditional Rule 10b-5 claim 
alleging a fraudulent scheme,12 however, Ms. Simmonds filed a novel 
derivative Section 16(b) claim, alleging that the underwriting banks 
of fifty-four issuing companies were liable for “short-swing 
profits . . . made in violation of Section 16(b).”13 Specifically, Ms. 
Simmonds alleged the underwriters had engaged in “spinning,”14 a 
controversial practice during the 1998-2000 hot issue market.15 
Section 16(b) requires statutory insiders16 to disgorge any profits 
made in connection with the purchase and sale of company stock 
occurring within a six-month period.17 Although Section 16(b) 
requires recovered profits to be paid directly to the issuer, Section 
16(b) claims can be brought in federal court by either the issuer itself 
or any shareholder.18 Importantly, however, shareholders may only 
bring a Section 16(b) claim if the issuer “shall fail or refuse to bring 
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to 
prosecute the same.”19 Thus, as a shareholder, Ms. Simmonds only 
had standing when the issuing companies themselves refused or 
 
 11. In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2009) aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3063 (2011), and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
3064 (2011). 
 12. Rule 10b-5 is the foundational securities fraud claim. See Matthew R. King et. al., 
Securities Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2009). 
 13. In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
 14. Id. at 1211. “Spinning” occurs when underwriting investment banks allocate IPO 
shares to corporate executives in order to secure future investment banking business. Xiaoding 
Liu & Jay R. Ritter, The Economic Consequences of IPO Spinning, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2024, 
2024–26 (2010) (analyzing the connection between spinning and IPO pricing); see also Sean J. 
Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential 
Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 586–87 (2004). 
 15. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 (2003), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/ 
documents/industry/p010373.pdf (naming spinning as one of the “most harmful practices” 
that occurred during the tech boom); Randall Smith, Long After Dotcom Bust, IPO ‘Spinning’ 
Rules Take Effect, WALL ST. J. DEAL BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com 
/deals/2011/09/26/long-after-dotcom-bust-ipo-spinning-rules-take-effect/. 
 16. For purposes of Section 16(b), directors, officers, and those owning more than ten 
percent of an issuing company’s stock are considered statutory insiders. 15 U.S.C. § 78p 
(2006). Ms. Simmonds contended that the underwriters, as the direct or beneficial owners of 
more than 10 percent of the issuing companies’ stock, qualified as statutory insiders. In re 
Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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failed to bring their own Section 16(b) claims. To comply with this 
requirement, Ms. Simmonds sent demand letters to the issuers’ 
board of directors, asking them to bring Section 16(b) claims against 
the underwriters.20 When the respective boards failed to take action, 
Ms. Simmonds filed a Section 16(b) claim in federal court to recover 
profits on behalf of the issuers.21 
At the district court, both the issuers and underwriters filed 
motions to dismiss the suit.22 The issuers specifically argued,23 inter 
alia, that Ms. Simmonds lacked standing because she failed to 
sufficiently identify the insiders in question or to describe the legal or 
factual basis for her claims.24 In response, Ms. Simmonds alleged 
that, as a mere shareholder, she was not privy to the trade or business 
information necessary to make a more specific factual allegation.25 
In granting the issuers’ motion to dismiss, and without 
addressing the underlying merits of her Section 16(b) claim, the 
district court used Delaware corporate law to outline the 
insufficiency of Ms. Simmonds’s demand letters.26 In particular, the 
court stated that sufficiency of demand was “governed by the law of 
the state of incorporation” and that because all the issuers were 
Delaware corporations, Delaware law would control.27 Under 
Delaware law,28 the court concluded, Ms. Simmonds had not given 
the issuing companies the “requisite specificity [in her demand 
letters] to give the directors a fair opportunity to initiate suit.”29 Or, 
to use the language of Section 16(b), the court determined that the 
directors of the issuing companies had not “fail[ed] or refuse[d]” to 
initiate suit.30 
 
 20. In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1210. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1208. 
 23. The underwriters likely did not argue the inadequacy of Ms. Simmonds’s demand 
letters because prior courts have held that in derivative suits, only the issuers have standing to 
object to a shareholder’s demand. See Dreiling v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co. Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 458 F.3d 942 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 24. In re Section 16(b) Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1210–11. 
 25. Id. at 1211. 
 26. Id. at 1211–12. 
 27. Id. at 1211. 
 28. More precisely, the Southern District of New York’s interpretation of Delaware law. 
Id. at 1211–13. 
 29. Id. at 1213. 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
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III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Interpreting the Scope and Demand of Section 16(b) 
With the rest of the Exchange Act, Section 16(b) was passed by 
Congress in an effort to ensure a “fair and honest market” where 
participants had access to all relevant information.31 Specifically, 
Congress included Section 16(b) to level the playing field for outside 
stockholders by preventing corporate insiders from making short-
swing speculative trades based upon their access to sensitive inside 
information.32 Due to the difficulty in policing whether a trade was 
actually made based on inside information, however, Section 16(b) 
imposes strict liability and requires a corporate insider to surrender 
any profits made in a short-swing trade, regardless of the basis of the 
trade.33 Thus, Congress intended Section 16(b) to be an “arbitrary 
rule capable of easy administration.”34 
In interpreting Section 16(b), courts have taken significant care 
to interpret its scope in light of this history, purpose, and text. Thus, 
where the terms of Section 16(b) are subject to differing 
constructions, they have been “given the construction that best 
serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation 
by corporate insiders.”35 For example, with respect to the scope of 
transactions covered by the statute, courts have been unyieldingly 
strict in carrying out the congressional design of “arbitrary and 
sweeping coverage.”36 Requiring such “meticulous observance” of 
the statute, courts have reasoned, is acceptable not only because the 
text of Section 16(b) is strict, but also because Section 16(b) 
imposes a relatively light penalty by only requiring disgorgement of 
profits made within six months and by only requiring profits to be 
paid back to the issuer.37 Thus, with regard to the scope of Section 
 
 31. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 356 
(7th Cir. 1975) (noting that the approach taken by Congress “maximize[s] the ability of the 
rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in proof” (quoting Bershad v. 
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970)). 
 34. Bershad, 428 F.2d at 696. 
 35. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972). 
 36. Bershad, 428 F.2d at 696; see Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(stating that courts have “liberally construed the rule”). 
 37. Bershad, 428 F.2d at 696–97. 
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16(b), courts appear to have faithfully implemented both its text and 
congressional design. 
With regard to the standing requirement of Section 16(b), 
however, it is unclear if courts have been as faithful. The difficulty 
posed by interpreting the standing requirement of Section 16(b) 
stems from its similarity to the demand requirements found in 
traditional derivative suits, where a shareholder sues to “enforce a 
corporate cause of action.”38 As a prerequisite for standing in a 
derivative suit, the shareholder must first “demand” that the issuer 
initiate the suit itself, giving notice of the proposed action to the 
board.39 Having received notice of the proposed action, the issuer 
can then exercise its “reasonable business judgment” and decide 
whether to pursue the shareholder’s claim itself or to ignore it.40 
Accordingly, when faced with the task of interpreting the standing of 
Section 16(b) plaintiffs, who sue on behalf of the issuer like in a 
traditional derivative action,41 courts have naturally turned to 
guidance provided by state demand requirements.42 
Unlike the traditional derivative suit, however, where the 
shareholder’s cause of action is based on a right of the issuer,43 
Section 16(b) confers a primary right to plaintiffs, giving standing to 
shareholders when the issuer “fail[s] or refuse[s] to bring such suit 
within sixty days after request.”44 Thus, by applying potentially 
conflicting state law in a Section 16(b) claim, courts have pushed the 
provision into the murky realm of corporate law federalism, where 
congressional design can meet head-to-head with state corporate 
governance. 
 
 38. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970) (emphasis added). This language of 
the Court highlights that in derivative suits the cause of action is derived from a right of the 
corporation, not the shareholder. Significantly, this does not mean that all suits brought on 
behalf of the corporation are derivative, because the cause of action may exist independently 
with the shareholder. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535 n.11 (1984). 
 39. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 530–33. 
 40. Id. at 533. 
 41. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1979). 
 43. Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 530–33.  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
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B. Corporate Law Federalism: Burks Answers and Kamen Reaffirms 
The interplay between federal securities law and state corporate 
governance is as old as the Securities Act of 193345 and as new as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.46 Even so, Congress has typically left 
corporate governance in the hands of the states.47 Likewise, the 
courts have been reluctant to use federal law to override principles of 
state corporate governance,48 reasoning that “[c]orporations are 
creatures of state law.”49 However, despite this rationale and in light 
of perceived failures of state corporate law in response to various 
crises, the federal government has increasingly “pulled more and 
more of the basic concerns of state corporate law into the regulatory 
ambit of federal law.”50 This infringement of federal securities laws 
on areas of corporate governance has posed difficult questions 
regarding the continuing role of the states in governing corporate 
fiduciary relationships, particularly regarding derivative actions.51 
Amid this confusion, the Supreme Court stepped forward in 
Burks v. Lasker and provided a framework for courts faced with an 
overlap between securities law and state corporate law.52 In Burks, 
shareholders brought a derivative suit against several of the 
company’s directors for an alleged violation of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (ICA), a federal securities regulation.53 In 
response, nondefendant directors of the company moved to dismiss 
the suit in federal court as contrary to the company’s interests.54 
 
 45. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 89 (2009). 
 46. See Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008); Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the 
Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
779, 791–92 (2004) (stating that by enacting sections of Sarbanes-Oxley, “Congress has, for 
the first time, taken away the right of Delaware to leave this space vacant”). 
 47. See Burks, 441 U.S. at 477. 
 48. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). 
 49. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
 50. Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the 
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2005); see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2491, 2494–95 (2005) (noting that “scandals call for quick action” from Congress 
where “Delaware acts slowly”). 
 51. See Burks, 441 U.S. at 471; In re Sapient Corp. Derivative Litig., 555 F. Supp. 2d 
259, 264 (D. Mass. 2008); Brummer, supra note 46, at 1069–70. 
 52. Burks, 441 U.S. at 471. 
 53. Id. at 473–74. 
 54. Id. 
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Thus, the case presented the question of whether the directors had 
the power to terminate a derivative suit brought as a federal cause of 
action.55 Under state law, the directors clearly had the power to 
terminate the suit, but at the same time, shareholders possessed a 
federal right of action.56 
The Court proceeded by establishing a baseline for similar cases: 
because Congress generally enacts new securities law in the 
“background of existing state law,” courts should first look to the 
relevant state’s corporate law to determine the proper relationship 
between shareholders and directors.57 Next, the Court performed a 
“consistency test,” and determined that the state law in question was 
consistent with the policy of the ICA.58 In explaining this test, the 
Court noted that “federal courts must be ever vigilant to insure that 
application of state law poses ‘no significant threat to any identifiable 
federal policy or interest’”59 and that state law should never “be 
allowed to destroy the federal right.”60 
In 1991, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic holding of 
Burks—defer to state law unless it is inconsistent with federal 
policy—in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services.61 In that case, the 
Court rejected the Second Circuit’s creation of new federal common 
law in assessing the futility of demand.62 Instead, the Court held that 
state law should provide the basis of the ICA demand requirement, 
reasoning that state law was consistent with the ICA in placing limits 
on the power of directors.63 Thus, the holdings and reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in Burks and Kamen provided a workable method 
for courts to navigate the interstices and interaction of federal 
securities law and state corporate governance. 
 
 55. Id. at 474. 
 56. Id. Because the ICA does not create an express right of action, the Court assumed 
for purposes of the case that the shareholders had an implied right of action. Id. 
 57. Id. at 478. 
 58. Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 479 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
 60. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cnty. v. United States, 
308 U.S. 343, 350 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991). While similar, one important distinction can be made 
between the fact patterns of Burks and Kamen. Whereas the plaintiff in Burks was assumed to 
have asserted an implied right of action under federal law, 441 U.S. at 474, the plaintiff in 
Kamen asserted a traditional derivative action claim—a state cause of action, 500 U.S. at 95. 
 62. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 109. 
 63. Id. at 108–09. 
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Simmonds, the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s Section 16(b) suit based on her failure to satisfy Delaware’s 
demand requirement.64 In reaching its decision, the court first 
decided Delaware law should govern.65 The court then concluded 
that, under Delaware law, Ms. Simmonds’s demand letters were 
insufficient to confer standing.66 
A. Application of Burks and Kamen 
After explaining the requirements and purpose of Section 16(b), 
the Ninth Circuit addressed how the demand requirement of Section 
16(b) should be interpreted. The court proceeded by citing the 
holding in Burks as parroted in Kamen: “[W]here a gap in the 
federal securities laws must be bridged . . . federal courts should 
incorporate state law into federal common law unless the particular 
state law . . . is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal 
statute.”67 
Next, the court summarily applied this rule to Section 16(b) and 
determined that in this case Ms. Simmond’s standing to make the 
claim should be determined by state corporate law.68 Thus, the court 
concluded, the adequacy of demand in Section 16(b) suits hinged on 
the application of state substantive law, and as all the issuers were 
Delaware corporations, Delaware law would apply in this case.69 
Before doing so, the court did note, as required under Burks, that it 
had a duty to determine if “there is a conflict between Delaware law 
and federal law.”70 However, the court only considered the purpose 
of Delaware’s demand requirement and failed to consider whether 
that purpose was consistent with the federal policies underlying 
Section 16(b).71 In fact, the court seemed to reverse the analysis used 
in Burks, stating that it “must ‘approximate state law as closely as 
 
 64. Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3063 (2011), and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
 65. Id. at 1088–89. 
 66. Id. at 1089–94. 
 67. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991). 
 68. Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1088. 
 69. Id. at 1088–89. 
 70. Id. at 1089. 
 71. Id. 
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possible in order to make sure that the vindication of the state right 
is without discrimination because of the federal forum.’”72  
B. Application of Delaware’s Demand Requirement 
Having decided to apply Delaware demand law, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Ms. Simmonds’s demand letters to the issuers 
were insufficient to confer standing in her Section 16(b) claim.73 
Specifically, while Ms. Simmonds had met the first prong of 
Delaware’s test for adequacy by alleging a “closed set of 
wrongdoers,” she had failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of 
the test by not identifying the actual wrongdoing and the legal 
action she wished the issuers to take.74 In the end, the court 
reasoned, Ms. Simmonds did not give the issuers sufficient 
information to investigate any wrongdoing.75 
V. ANALYSIS 
Although the outcome of Simmonds may have been correct 
regardless of whether state law was applied, the analysis is troubling 
because the court failed to apply the consistency test of Burks and, 
accordingly, failed to consider the fit between Delaware’s demand 
requirement and Section 16(b). Given the lack of emphasis by prior 
courts on the Burks consistency test and considering that the 
application of state corporate law is routine in many securities claims, 
the Ninth Circuit’s actions in Simmonds do not seem extraordinary. 
Ex ante, however, failure to apply the consistency test of Burks will 
allow state corporate law to frustrate the objectives of federal 
securities law and to impede otherwise meritorious securities claims. 
A. Consistency of Demand Requirements with the Text and Purpose of 
Section 16(b) 
Had the Ninth Circuit applied the Burks consistency test, it likely 
would have found Delaware demand law to be inconsistent with the 
text and purpose of Section 16(b). As a starting point, Section 16(b) 
 
 72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 
2007)). 
 73. Id. at 1094. 
 74. Id. at 1092. 
 75. Id. at 1093. 
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itself indicates that the statute is unique when compared to other 
federal securities laws. Unlike the ICA, for example, which only 
allows shareholder suits in response to a breach of fiduciary duty,76 
Section 16(b) bypasses the judgment of directors by giving 
shareholders an express right to sue in the absence of director 
action.77 Indeed, courts and commentators have reasoned that 
Section 16(b) claims are not derivative suits at all78 and, therefore, 
are not subject to termination by director action.79 
The congressional design of Section 16(b) confirms this 
conclusion. Congress passed Section 16(b) to increase the power of 
shareholders vis-à-vis corporate insiders and to correct “widespread 
abuse of . . . fiduciary relationships,”80 showing congressional intent 
to affirmatively infringe upon a traditional area of state corporate 
governance. This reasoning resonates with Supreme Court dicta in 
Burks stating that Section 16(b) authorizes shareholder suits 
“notwithstanding the decision of the board of directors not to sue”81 
and is an example of a statute where “Congress did intend to prevent 
board action from cutting off derivative suits.”82 
In contrast, the purpose of Delaware demand law dictates 
precisely the opposite. Generally, demand law reinforces the ability 
of directors to determine the best interests of the corporation in 
deciding whether to pursue litigation.83 Specifically, even if a 
 
 76. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006); see 
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (stating that, in the ICA, Congress intended to 
maintain the ability of directors to terminate derivative suits). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
 78. See, e.g., Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir. 1955) (“[Section 
16(b)] creates a new cause of action, which, while similar in some respects to a secondary or 
derivative right, is not such a right at all. It is in reality a primary right.”); Arnold S. Jacobs, An 
Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 570 
(1987) (“[T]he thoughtful decisions addressing the issue conclude that a section 16(b) suit is 
not a derivative action.”). 
 79. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: 
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 289 (1981) 
(noting that the text of Section 16(b) “reflect[s] a strong statutory policy giving the 
shareholder-plaintiff the ultimate discretion” regarding the litigation); Jacobs, supra note 78, 
at 571. 
 80. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959); see supra Part III.A. 
 81. Burks, 441 U.S. at 484 n.13. 
 82. Id. at 484. 
 83. See Allison ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 
1117 (D. Del. 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Decisions as to how and on what 
theory the corporation will pursue wrongdoers are the proper province of the Board of 
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shareholder makes sufficient demand to directors, the directors’ 
decision to pursue the claim is entitled to deference under the 
business judgment rule, normally “an insuperable barrier.”84 Such 
deference, which may deter plaintiffs from making demand at all, 
directly conflicts with the text of Section 16(b), which expressly 
allows a shareholder suit if the issuer “refuse[s] to bring such suit.”85 
Thus, whereas demand requirements create a powerful screen for 
directors to use in blocking shareholder suits,86 Section 16(b) 
appears to poke a small hole. 
Recognizing this inherent conflict between some remedial 
securities laws and state demand requirements is not novel. In Galef 
v. Alexander, for example, the Second Circuit recognized the 
conflict between state demand requirements and a shareholder claim 
brought under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.87 There, the court 
concluded that federal policy prevented defendants from using the 
business judgment rule to dismiss Section 14(a) claims.88 Other 
courts have reached similar conclusions, although none have 
addressed the federal policy underlying Section 16(b).89 
Finally, the holding of Kamen did not control the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to apply Delaware’s demand requirement. As 
noted earlier, although the Kamen Court refused to create a federal 
common law demand requirement, it only did so after confirming 
that the applicable state law would be consistent with the ICA.90 The 
applicable state law in that case was consistent with the federal policy 
invoked in the ICA because the state law limited the power of 
 
Directors.”); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Demand on Directors—Rationales for Demand, in 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW & PRACTICE § 5:9 (2011). 
 84. John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces 
the Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407, 1411 (1993); see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984) (explaining the importance of the business judgment rule in derivative 
actions), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
 86. See Coffee, supra note 84, at 1411. 
 87. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Wolf v. 
Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 477 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 989, 
998 (W.D. Pa. 1993). But see Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 
OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 580 (1984). 
 90. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991). 
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directors by creating a futility exception to the normal demand 
requirement.91 
Thus, in light of these conflicting purposes, if the Ninth Circuit 
had performed a Burks consistency test, it likely would have found 
Delaware’s demand requirement to be inconsistent with the text and 
purpose of Section 16(b). Accordingly, the court should not have 
applied Delaware demand law to dismiss Ms. Simmonds’s suit.92 
B. Ex Ante Implications 
1. Unnecessary federal displacement 
If state corporate law—like the demand requirement imposed in 
Simmonds—infringes upon the enforcement of federal policy, “media 
saliency” and public fervor may prompt Congress to expressly 
preempt the area.93 For an example of a powerful federal response to 
a perceived failure of corporate governance, one need only look to 
the more recent scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and others. 
In response to what many perceived as deficiencies in general 
corporate governance, Congress and other authorities enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which included a “wide array of 
corporate governance requirements”94 and “initiatives that mandate 
board structure and authority.”95 
Although some argue that federal displacement of state corporate 
governance is beneficial,96 such displacement should only occur 
 
 91. Id. at 108. 
 92.  Although alternative methods by which the court could have decided the case are 
outside the limited scope of this Note, the court did have viable options. For example, if it 
determined that Delaware’s demand law was inconsistent with Section 16(b), the court could 
have fashioned its own federal common law requirement for Section 16(b) claims. See Kamen, 
500 U.S. at 97 (stating that for federal statutes, “any common law rule necessary to effectuate 
a private cause of action under that statute is necessarily federal in character”). Indeed, this 
approach seems to be the most consistent with Burks, where the Supreme Court used Section 
16(b) as an example of a statute where Congress did not intend the normal state corporate 
governance rules to apply. See 441 U.S. at 484 & n.13. 
 93. Roe, supra note 50, at 2493 (“[W]hen media saliency puts the matter on the federal 
agenda . . . Delaware loses its dominance.”). 
 94. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 955 (2003). 
 95. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003). 
 96. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974). For an argument against federalization of corporate law, see, 
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where state law is inadequate in achieving the results for which it was 
designed. In Simmonds, for example, one can imagine the result if 
the plaintiff had, on the merits, a valid Section 16(b) claim. Delaware 
demand law would have impeded an otherwise valid federal securities 
claim, leading to speculation that Delaware’s demand requirement 
should be displaced in order to prevent the frustration of federal 
policy. However, Delaware’s demand requirement was simply not 
designed to address the federal policy underlying Section 16(b) and, 
therefore, should not be discarded as inadequately fulfilling a 
purpose it was never intended to achieve. 
Thus, the consistency test outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Burks plays an important role in corporate law federalism by 
preventing conflict between federal policies and state corporate law. 
If courts skip the consistency test and automatically turn to state law 
to fill the gaps of securities laws, they may not only impede 
meritorious securities claims but also unnecessarily prompt 
preemption of state corporate law. 
2. Epilogue 
While not in response to the court’s decision in Simmonds, the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has already, and 
predictably, addressed concerns related to the suit.97 In 2011, 
FINRA adopted regulations to bar “spinning,”98 one of Ms. 
Simmonds’s chief complaints.99 The regulations stemmed from the 
recommendations of an IPO advisory committee formed to respond 
to the 1998–2000 hot issue market—a market where former 
WorldCom chief executive Bernard Ebbers earned $11.5 million 
over five years while his company doled out $76 million in banking 
fees at the same time.100 The advisory committee’s first 
recommendation called for each board of directors to contain an 
 
e.g., Chandler & Strine, supra note 94, at 1005. 
 97. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend FINRA Rule 5131 (New 
Issue Allocations and Distributions), 76 Fed. Reg. 24,076 (Apr. 29, 2011). 
 98. Id. at 24,077 (stating that the proposed rule prohibits spinning, “an underwriter’s 
allocation of IPO shares to directors or executives of investment banking clients in exchange 
for receipt of investment banking business”); see supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 99. Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011) 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3063 (2011), and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
 100. Randall Smith, Rule over the Abuse of IPOs Is Delayed, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2011, at 
C1. 
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“IPO pricing committee,”101 foreshadowing further federal 
displacement of state corporate law. All of these proposed reforms 
may not be necessary, however, because a mechanism to correct 
some of the abuse may already be in place through Section 16(b), 
albeit exercised too late in Simmonds. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not Ms. Vanessa Simmonds had a valid Section 
16(b) claim, the Ninth Circuit could have more carefully considered 
whether Delaware demand law was consistent with the federal policy 
underlying Section 16(b). Had the court done so, it likely would 
have found that the text and purpose of Section 16(b) inconsistent 
with Delaware’s demand requirement. Accordingly, the court should 
not have used Delaware demand law to dismiss the suit. 
And although events since the IPO of LinkedIn indicate that we 
are not likely to witness another hot issue market in the near 
future,102 one could certainly occur again and would be accompanied 
by more securities claims.103 If courts fail to consider the fit between 
federal securities law and state corporate law in these cases, they may 
not only impede valid securities claims, but they might also spur 












 101. NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 4. For an overview 
and analysis of the proposed reforms, see Hurt, supra note 7, at 771–82. 
 102. See Lynn Cowan & Randall Smith, Global Finance: That IPO Pop?, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 15, 2011, at C3. 
 103. See Hurt, supra note 7, at 785–86, 790 (“[A]nother IPO boom is certain to appear, 
and retail investors will again fall prey to the abuses inherent in the IPO process.”). 
  J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
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